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SENTENCING FACTORS AND INTENT:
THE ROLE OF MENS REA IN A FEDERAL GUN STATUTE
Michael J. Naporano ∗
I.

INTRODUCTION

Bob walks into a bank, raises his loaded 9mm Berretta pistol, and
demands cash. As Bob scoops up money from the counter, he mishandles his weapon and accidentally fires a round into the ceiling, injuring no one. Depending on where in the United States this incident occurs, Bob may have just added three additional years to his
prison sentence for discharging his firearm.
1
Section 924(c)(1)(A) of the Gun Control Act of 1968 is a federal gun control statute, which imposes mandatory minimum prison
sentences on those who commit certain crimes with firearms. The
statute begins by listing the elements of a complete crime in the following principle paragraph:

∗

J.D., 2008, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2001, Bucknell University. The author would like to thank Professor John Wefing for reviewing numerous
drafts and providing valuable insight.
1
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2000). Setting out the relevant portions of the statute in full:
Except to the extent that a greater minimum sentence is otherwise
provided by this subsection or by any other provision of law, any person
who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking
crime (including a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime that
provides for an enhanced punishment if committed by the use of a
deadly or dangerous weapon or device) for which the person may be
prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm, or
who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug
trafficking crime—
(i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5
years;
(ii) if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 7 years; and
(iii) if the firearm is discharged, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 10 years.
Id.
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[A]ny person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence
or drug trafficking crime . . . uses or carries a firearm, or who, in
furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence or
drug trafficking crime—
(i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than
2
5 years.

To receive the five-year mandatory sentence under this paragraph, a defendant must be indicted under this section and either
3
plead guilty or be found guilty by a jury. The statute contains two
further provisions, however, which increase the mandatory minimum
4
sentences depending on the existence of two additional factors. The
statute increases the minimum sentence to seven years “if the firearm
5
6
is brandished,” and to ten years “if the firearm is discharged.”
7
In 2002, the Supreme Court in Harris v. United States ruled that
these brandishing and discharge provisions were sentencing factors
8
and not separate offenses. Thus, the sentencing judge must impose
an increased sentence of seven or ten years even though “[t]hat factor need not be alleged in the indictment, submitted to the jury, or
9
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” To increase a defendant’s sentence from five years to seven or ten years requires only a judicial
finding of the existence of certain facts by a preponderance of the
10
evidence. This Comment explores whether a judge, while sentencing a defendant under § 924(c)’s discharge provision, is required to
find that the defendant intended to discharge the firearm. In the example given above, Bob accidentally discharged the firearm into the
ceiling. In the D.C. and Ninth Circuits, Bob would not receive the
increased sentence because he lacked the intent to discharge the fire11
arm. However, in the Tenth and Sixth Circuits, Bob is strictly liable

2

Id. § 924(c)(1)(A).
See Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 551–52 (2002).
4
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii–iii).
5
Id. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii).
6
Id. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii).
7
536 U.S. 545.
8
Id. at 556.
9
Id. at 568.
10
See id. at 568–69.
11
See United States v. Brown, 449 F.3d 154 (D.C. Cir. 2006); United States v.
Dare, 425 F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 2005).
3
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for the discharge and must serve the minimum ten-year prison sen12
tence.
Before discussing the circuit split regarding whether the discharge provision requires intent, the following issue must be clarified:
how can a judge increase a defendant’s sentence based on facts not
alleged in the indictment nor found by a jury without offending the
constitutional requirements declared by the Supreme Court in Ap13
prendi v. New Jersey and subsequent cases? Under Apprendi, “any fact
. . . that increases the penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable
14
doubt.” The answer lies in § 924(c)’s unstated statutory maximum
15
of life imprisonment. A jury conviction under § 924(c)’s underlying
offense of using or carrying a firearm during the commission of a
crime, even without finding that the defendant brandished or discharged the firearm, would subject the defendant to a potential sen16
tence range from five years to life in prison. In fact, the plurality in
Harris, cognizant of Apprendi’s holding, distinguished § 924(c) from
the statute at issue in Apprendi, noting that § 924(c) contains no prescribed statutory maximum, thus, “the judge may impose a sentence
well in excess of seven years, whether or not the defendant bran17
dished [or discharged] the firearm.”
Yet, as this Comment discusses, doubt as to Harris’s viability lingers due to shifting dynamics within the Supreme Court, and discor18
dant rulings and dicta in later Supreme Court sentencing opinions.
The Court has been expanding Sixth Amendment protections by limiting a judge’s ability to increase penalties during the sentencing
19
phase. If Harris were to be overruled, § 924(c)’s brandishing and
discharge provisions would no longer be sentencing factors to be
found by a judge, but criminal elements with full procedural protec20
tions of a jury trial. If so, mens rea could not be averted so easily,
12

See United States v. Nava-Sotelo, 354 F.3d 1202 (10th Cir. 2003); United States
v. Tunstall, 49 Fed. Appx. 581 (6th Cir. 2002).
13
530 U.S. 466 (2000).
14
Id. at 476 (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999)).
15
United States v. Gamboa, 439 F.3d 796, 811 (8th Cir. 2006).
16
Id.; Dare, 425 F.3d at 640; United States v. Sandoval, 241 F.3d 549, 551 (7th Cir.
2001); see also Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 554 (2002).
17
Harris, 536 U.S. at 554.
18
United States v. Malouf, 377 F. Supp. 2d 315, 327 (D. Mass. 2005).
19
See Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007); United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); Apprendi, 530 U.S.
466.
20
See Harris, 536 U.S. at 560 (distinguishing between offense elements and sentencing factors).
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and the courts that currently impose strict liability on § 924(c)’s discharge provision would find little justification for doing so. But Har21
ris has not yet been overruled. Thus, this Comment must proceed
under the assumed viability of Harris’s ruling that § 924(c)’s discharge provision is a sentencing factor and not a separate element to
be found by a jury.
The circuit courts that have split regarding § 924(c)’s mens rea
requirement have not only differed in their conclusions but also in
22
their analytical methods. One side uses traditional tools of statutory
interpretation, which includes an analysis of the text, structure, and
history of the statute backstopped by the doctrines of lenity and the
23
presumption against strict liability. These courts conclude that the
statute is ambiguous but that Congress intended for the discharge
24
provision to require mens rea. Yet the fact that Harris ruled that the
discharge provision is a sentencing factor has created an alternative
analysis because sentencing factors generally do not afford the same
25
procedural rights to defendants as regular offense elements. The
question then becomes whether a judge can automatically dismiss the
mens rea requirement for a sentencing factor simply because it is a
sentencing factor. This characterizes the position taken by the circuits which have concluded that § 924(c)’s discharge provision does
26
not require criminal intent. These courts rely heavily on Harris, and
seem to create a rule that judges need not determine a defendant’s
mental culpability when finding facts that are sentencing enhance27
ments and not elements of a crime.
The fact that a judge can theoretically sentence a defendant up
to life in prison under § 924(c)’s underlying offense would threaten
to make any debate over the discharge provision’s intent requirement
either irrelevant or completely academic if not for the actual practice
in federal courts today. For instance, judges who sentence defendants under § 924(c) rarely, if ever, deviate from the applicable min28
imum sentence. Thus, a defendant who is sentenced under the dis21

United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 575 (3d Cir. 2007).
Compare United States v. Nava-Sotelo, 354 F.3d 1202 (10th Cir. 2003), with
United States v. Brown, 449 F.3d 154 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
23
E.g., Brown, 449 F.3d 154.
24
E.g., id. at 158.
25
See Harris, 536 U.S. at 560.
26
E.g., Nava-Sotelo, 354 F.3d at 1206.
27
Id.
28
Harris, 536 U.S. at 578 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
The suggestion that a 7-year sentence could be imposed even without a
finding that a defendant brandished a firearm ignores the fact that the
22
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charge provision will almost always receive a sentence of exactly ten
years, but if found not to have discharged a firearm, would usually
serve only seven years for brandishing, or even five years if the defen29
dant neither brandished nor discharged the firearm. The stakes are
raised by § 924(c)’s imposition of mandatory sentences, which not
only preclude judges from departing downward to compensate for
30
individualized circumstances, but also run consecutively with any
31
other sentence. Finally, a judicial finding that the defendant discharged a firearm condemns him to at least three additional years in
32
federal prison without the possibility of parole.
Parts II and III of this Comment explore the statute’s legislative
history and discuss the Supreme Court’s increasingly fragile decision
33
in Harris.
Part IV discusses the divergent rulings among circuit
courts and explores the different methods these courts have used to
34
analyze whether the discharge provision of § 924(c) requires intent.
Part V discusses the rule created in the Tenth Circuit that sentencing
factors do not require a finding of mens rea, and demonstrates that
35
Part VI discusses the
such a rule is unworkable and inaccurate.
standard tools that federal courts use in interpreting a statute to determine whether it requires a finding of mens rea, and also argues
36
that the discharge provision is ambiguous regarding mens rea. Finally, this Comment concludes that courts should require that the defendant intended to discharge a firearm under § 924(c)’s discharge
provision.

sentence imposed when a defendant is found only to have “carried” a
firearm “in relation to” a drug trafficking offense appears to be, almost
uniformly, if not invariably, five years. Similarly, those found to have
brandished a firearm typically, if not always, are sentenced only to 7
years in prison while those found to have discharged a firearm are sentenced only to 10 years.
Id.
29

Id.
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i–iii) (2006) (defining the terms of imprisonment as
“not less than” five, seven, or ten years).
31
Id. § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii).
32
See id. § 924(c)(1)(D)(i).
33
See infra notes 37–97 and accompanying text.
34
See infra notes 98–180 and accompanying text.
35
See infra notes 181–203 and accompanying text.
36
See infra notes 202–43 and accompanying text.
30
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II. THE HISTORY OF 18 U.S.C. § 924(C) AND ITS
DISCHARGE PROVISION
The present form of § 924(c)(1)(A) is rooted in the Gun Con37
trol Act of 1968 and is the product of multiple amendments
38
throughout the years. The original statute imposed a mandatory
minimum sentence of at least one year on offenders who “use” or
39
“carry” a firearm during the commission of any federal felony.
However, the statute’s effect was weakened because it allowed parole
and sentencing judges could suspend the sentence; furthermore, Supreme Court cases interpreted the provision as a cumulative en40
hancement instead of a separate offense. Because of these ways to
get around the penalty, Congress amended § 924(c) with the Com41
prehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, which reduced potential
variations in sentences. Specifically, the amendment ensured that an
offender who used a firearm “during and in relation to any crime of

37

Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (1968) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.).
(c)Whoever—
(1) uses a firearm to commit any felony which may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, or
(2) carries a firearm unlawfully during the commission of any felony which may be prosecuted in a court of the United States,
shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for not less than one year
nor more than 10 years.
Id.
38
Thomas A. Clare, Smith v. United States and the Modern Interpretation of 18
U.S.C. § 924(c): A Proposal to Amend the Federal Armed Offender Statute, 69 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 815, 823–26 (1994).
39
Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213.
40
Clare, supra note 38, at 823.
41
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837
(1984) (codified as amended in various sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.). The
Act amended 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) to read as follows:
Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence . . . uses or
carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment for such crime of
violence, be sentenced to imprisonment for five years. . . . Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court shall not place on probation or suspend the sentence of any person convicted of a violation of
this subsection, nor shall the term of imprisonment imposed under this
subsection run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment, including that imposed for the crime of violence in which the firearm
was used or carried. No person sentenced under this subsection shall
be eligible for parole during the term of imprisonment imposed
herein.
Id.
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violence” would serve a minimum sentence of five years that was con42
secutive to the sentence for the underlying offense.
In 1986, Congress again amended the statute with the passage of
43
the Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, which made the mandatory
minimum five-year sentence applicable when an offender uses or car44
ries a firearm during a “drug trafficking crime.” Between 1986 and
1998 additional amendments both redefined “drug trafficking crime”
45
into the definition that is still used today and varied sentence
46
lengths based on the type of firearm involved.
In 1995, the Supreme Court determined what type of activity sat47
isfied the “uses and carries” language of the statute.
The Court
unanimously held that for the accused to be liable for “use” of the
firearm, the accused must have actively employed the firearm so that
48
the firearm is an operative factor in the underlying offense. Thus,
the Court substantially narrowed the scope of the statute, decreasing
49
its potential use by prosecutors.
50
To restore the statute’s effectiveness, in 1998 Congress
amended the statute to ensure that the penalties set forth would apply not only to someone who uses and carries a firearm, but also to

42

Id.
Firearms Owners’ Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 104(a)(2)
(A–F), 100 Stat. 449, 456–57 (1986).
44
Id.
45
See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 6212, 102 Stat. 4181,
4360 (“the term ‘drug trafficking crime’ means any felony punishable under the
Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.), the Controlled Substances Import
and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 951 et seq.), or the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act
(46 U.S.C. App. 1901 et seq.)”).
46
See Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 1101, 104 Stat. 4789, 4829
(increased sentences for short-barreled shotguns, short-barreled rifles, and destructive devices); Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-322, 110102, 108 Stat. 1796, 1996 (1998) (increased sentences for semi-automatic
assault weapons).
47
Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 150 (1995).
48
Id. at 143.
49
Paul J. Hofer, Federal Sentencing for Violent and Drug Trafficking Crimes Involving
Firearms: Recent Changes and Prospects for Improvement, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 41, 60–61
(2000) (estimating that “between 1500 and 2250 cases in a typical year were disqualified for Section 924(c) by the Bailey decision”). To demonstrate how much of an
impact these estimated numbers had, see 144 CONG. REC. H530, H531 (daily ed. Feb.
24, 1998) (statement of Rep. McCollum) (“According to the U.S. Sentencing Commission, there were 10,576 defendants sentenced from 1991 to 1996 under this section.”).
50
See 144 CONG. REC. S. 12670 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1998) (statement of Sen. DeWine) (referring to the bill as “the Bailey Fix Act, also known as the use or carry
bill”).
43
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51

one who possesses a firearm during and in relation to a crime.
These amendments to the statute were the last substantial changes to
the statute and have given the statute its current structure and substance. In these amendments, Congress also added the “brandish”
52
and “discharge” provisions. The statute still rejects both probation
53
and concurrent sentences, creating what is known as a mandatory
minimum sentence.
The modern-day mandatory minimum sentences were devel54
oped in 1956 and marked the beginning of a gradual shift in Con55
gress’s sentencing goals from rehabilitation to deterrence. Before
the advent of mandatory minimums, most statutes allowed judges
56
great freedom to exercise discretion at sentencing. However, since
the onset of mandatory minimum statutes, defendants have been increasingly vulnerable to generalized penalties that disregard unique
57
circumstances. By maximizing deterrence and limiting judicial discretion during sentencing, these statutes may lead to great “miscar58
riages of justice.” Justice Kennedy has called for the abolition of
59
mandatory minimums, calling them “unwise and unjust.”
Justice
Breyer has also criticized them, calling them “fundamentally inconsistent with Congress’ simultaneous effort to create a fair, honest, and
rational sentencing system through the use of Sentencing Guide60
lines.” Similar criticism has been leveled specifically at § 924(c)’s
mandatory minimum penalties. For instance, political uproar ensued
in January 2007, after two U.S. Border Patrol agents received mini51

Mandatory Minimum Prison Sentences for Firearms Violations, Pub. L. No.
105-386, 112 Stat. 3469, 3469–70 (1998).
52
Id.
53
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(D) (2006).
54
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM
PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 6 (1991), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/r_congress/MANMIN.pdf.
55
Clare, supra note 38, at 820.
56
Joseph E. Kennedy, Making the Crime Fit the Punishment, 51 EMORY L.J. 753, 788
(2002).
57
United States v. Cordoba-Hincapie, 825 F. Supp. 485, 522–23 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)
(“The Anglo-American tradition of individualized sentencing is under great pressure
from a system that has both deprived sentencing judges of much of their discretion
and imported many questions traditionally handled at the conviction stage into the
sentencing process.”).
58
Paul G. Cassell, Too Severe?: A Defense of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (and a
Critique of Federal Mandatory Minimums), 56 STAN. L. REV. 1017, 1045 (2004).
59
Anthony M. Kennedy, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States,
Speech at the American Bar Association Annual Meeting (Aug. 9, 2003), available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_08-09-03.html.
60
Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 570 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring).
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mum ten-year sentences under § 924(c)’s discharge provision for
61
The sentences drew heavy
shooting a suspected drug smuggler.
criticism from members of Congress for being too lengthy, and, as a
result, lawmakers introduced a rash of legislation to remedy the per62
None of the attempted remedies, however, inceived injustice.
63
cluded modification of the statute itself.
III. HARRIS V. UNITED STATES

64

A. The Discharge Provision Is a Sentencing Factor, Not an
Element of an Offense
In Harris v. United States in 2002, the Supreme Court analyzed
the amended statute, specifically the brandish provision. Petitioner
Harris ran a pawnshop, and at trial he was found guilty of selling
marijuana to his friend while holstering a semiautomatic pistol at his
65
side. Normally he carried the gun with him in his shop regardless
66
of whether he was selling drugs. The federal prosecutor indicted
Harris under § 924(c)(1)(A), but the indictment said nothing of
“brandishing” and only alleged the elements from the statute’s principal paragraph—that Harris possessed a firearm during the commis67
A judge found Harris guilty as
sion of a drug trafficking crime.
charged at a bench trial, found by a preponderance of evidence during the sentencing hearing that Harris had brandished the gun, and
68
sentenced him to seven years. The appellate court subsequently af69
firmed.
After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court sought to determine whether the “brandish” provision was a sentencing factor or a
61

Jerry Seper, Border Agents’ Punishment “High,” Sentencing Guidelines Directed by
Congress, Prosecutor Says, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2007, at A4.
62
Fred Lucas, No More Federal Money to Jail Border Agents, Congressman Says at
CNSNEWS.COM, Jan. 26, 2007, http://www.cnsnews.com/news/viewstory.asp?Page=/
Nation/archive/200701/NAT20070126e.html. Attempted remedies included petitioning the president to exercise his presidential veto, drafting legislation to deny
funding specifically for the incarceration of the agents, and attempting to vacate the
court’s ruling. Id.
63
Douglas A. Berman, Using the Border Agent Case as a Catalyst for Federal Sentencing
Reform, SENT’G L. & POL’Y, Jan. 29, 2007, http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing
_law_and_policy/2007/01/using_the_borde.html.
64
536 U.S. 545.
65
Id. at 550.
66
Id. at 573, n. 1 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
67
Id. at 551.
68
Id.
69
Id.
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70

separate offense.
The Court presumed from the structure of §
924(c) that “its principal paragraph defines a single crime and its
71
subsections identify sentencing factors.” The Court also found no
congressional tradition of treating “brandishing” and “discharging” as
72
separate offenses.
Moreover, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
had a history of treating “brandishing” and “discharging” as sentence
73
enhancements. The Court thus determined that the 1998 amend74
ments were likely a byproduct of those guidelines.
Finally, the Court found that the incremental increase from five
to seven years under the brandishing provision was consistent with
the traditional role of sentencing enhancements because “the required findings constrain, rather then extend, the sentencing judge’s
75
discretion.” The Court found of particular importance the fact that
the brandishing provision only increases the minimum sentence un76
der a statute which carries no maximum sentence.
For instance,
under the statute, a judge could sentence a defendant anywhere from
the prescribed mandatory minimum up to life in prison, regardless of
77
whether the defendant brandished a firearm. The Court compared
78
§ 924(c) to the statute at issue in McMillan v. Pennsylvania, which
also imposed mandatory minimum sentences and which the Court
79
also upheld. The Harris Court found that the mandatory penalty
enhancement under the brandishing provision does not implicate
80
the constitutional concerns that were raised in Apprendi. The Court
therefore had no problem treating the brandishing provision as a
sentencing factor when it only slightly increased the mandatory minimum sentence under a statute that allowed a judge to sentence the
81
defendant “well in excess of seven years.” The Harris Court, how-

70

Harris, 536 U.S. at 552.
Id. at 553.
72
Id.
73
Id. (noting that “[u]nder the Sentencing Guidelines, moreover, brandishing
and discharging affect the sentences for numerous federal crimes”).
74
Id.
75
Id. at 554.
76
Harris, 536 U.S. at 557.
77
Id. at 554; see also United States v. Gamboa, 439 F.3d 796, 811 (8th Cir. 2006)
(noting that “§ 924(c)’s unstated statutory maximum is life in prison”).
78
477 U.S. 79 (1986).
79
Id. at 91.
80
Harris, 536 U.S. at 565.
81
Id. at 554.
71
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ever, did not discuss the mens rea requirement of the discharge or
82
brandish provision because it was not raised in the petitioner’s brief.
The practical consequences of determining that a statutory provision is a sentencing factor are substantial. Sentencing factors can
be tried in a separate hearing where the rules of evidence and bur83
dens of proof are heavily altered in favor of the government. Once
the government establishes “a threshold mens rea to convict the defendant of the substantive crime,” the courts generally have not required finding mens rea during the sentencing phase to increase pe84
Critics argue against sentencing hearings because these
nalties.
hearings fail to provide the same procedural protections as trials,
such as the right to confront adverse witnesses, notice of the charges,
85
and the right to trial by jury.
B. Yet Harris Teeters on the Brink of Invalidity
86

The validity of Harris’s ruling is tenuous. The Harris opinion
garnered only a slim five-to-four plurality—Justices Thomas, Stevens,
Souter, and Ginsberg dissented, while Justice Breyer merely con87
curred in part. The four dissenting Justices argued that punishment
under the increased mandatory minimum penalty for brandishing
should afford defendants all the constitutional protections that are
88
afforded under any other offense. The dissent reasoned that the
same principles that guided the Court in Apprendi were also present
89
here when dealing with mandatory minimum sentences :“[w]hether

82

Brief of Petitioner, Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002) (No. 0010666).
83
Richard Singer, The Model Penal Code and Three Two (Possibly Only One) Ways
Courts Avoid Mens Rea, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 139, 145 (2000).
84
Alun Griffiths, Comment, People v. Ryan: A Trap for the Unwary, 61 BROOK. L.
REV. 1011, 1028–29 (1995).
85
Jacqueline E. Ross, What Makes Sentencing Facts Controversial? Four Problems Obscured by One Solution, 47 VILL. L. REV. 965, 965 (2002).
86
United States v. Malouf, 377 F. Supp. 2d 315, 327 (D. Mass. 2005).
87
Harris, 536 U.S. at 569–83.
88
Id. at 579–80 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
[T]here are no logical grounds for treating facts triggering mandatory
minimums any differently than facts that increase the statutory maximum. . . . In either case the defendant must be afforded the procedural protections of notice, a jury trial, and a heightened standard of
proof with respect to the facts warranting exposure to a greater penalty.
Id.
89
Id. at 579 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“It is true that Apprendi concerned a fact
that increased the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, but
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one raises the floor or raises the ceiling it is impossible to dispute that
the defendant is exposed to greater punishment than is otherwise
90
prescribed.” The departure of Justices Rehnquist and O’Connor,
two of the Justices in the Harris plurality, has increased the fragility of
that decision. Their replacements, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Alito, recently diverged from Harris’s ruling in determining the
91
breadth of Apprendi’s application during sentencing.
In addition to Harris’s foundational cracks, federal courts have
expressed doubts as to its continuing validity in light of recent Su92
preme Court decisions in Blakely v. Washington and Booker v. United
93
States. Through Blakely and Booker, the Court extended the breadth
of Apprendi’s Sixth Amendment jury protections, although not spe94
cifically to federal mandatory minimum statutes. Several lower and
appellate courts have inferred from these recent opinions that Harris
is no longer good law, arguing that the Court’s reasoning in Blakely
and Booker extends to § 924(c)’s mandatory minimum sentencing en95
hancements. Moreover, courts have treated the discharge provision
the principles upon which it relied apply with equal force to those facts that expose
the defendant to a higher mandatory minimum.”).
90
Id.
91
See Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007). Chief Justice Roberts
joined the majority in invalidating California’s determinate sentencing scheme for
violating Apprendi’s rule that juries must determine all facts that expose a defendant
to a greater sentence. Justice Alito, dissenting, would have upheld the sentencing
scheme, positing that “[t]he Court . . . has never suggested that all factual findings
that affect a defendant’s sentence must be made by a jury.” Id. at 873 (Alito, J., dissenting).
92
542 U.S. 296 (2004).
93
543 U.S. 220 (2005).
94
See Id. at 243 (U.S. Sentencing Guidelines); Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303 (Washington State Sentencing Reform Act).
95
United States v. Dare, 425 F.3d 634, 647–648 (9th Cir. 2005) (Bea, J., dissenting) (stating that Harris is limited by Booker, in that § 924(c)’s statutory maximum for
Apprendi purposes is now the five-year maximum imposed by the Sentencing Guidelines unless the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant discharged
the firearm); United States v. Harris, 397 F.3d 404, 413–14 (6th Cir. 2005) (concluding that “Booker does require that § 924 Firearm-Type Provision enhancements be
charged in the indictment and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt”). The
Sixth Circuit noted in dicta that it could not apply its conclusion to § 924(c)’s discharge provision, even though the provision that it ruled on is similar in structure
and form, simply because doing so would expressly violate Harris’s holding that the
discharge provision was a sentencing factor to be found by a judge. Id. at 414 n.5; see
also United States v. Malouf, 377 F. Supp. 2d 315, 324–25 (D. Mass. 2005) (positing
that the Supreme Court’s extension of the Sixth Amendment in Blakely “necessarily
casts doubt on Harris’s distinction between mandatory minimum provisions and
statutory maximums. . . . Moreover, if Federal Sentencing Guidelines troubled the
majority in Booker, despite the possibility of downward departures, mandatory minimum provisions are likely to be of even greater concern.”).

NAPORANO (FINAL)

2008]

12/1/2008 12:45:32 PM

COMMENT

1579

as a fact to be determined by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, even
96
after Harris. For instance, the lower court in United States v. Brown,
in which a defendant was charged under § 924(c), sent to the jury the
question of whether the defendant discharged the weapon to ensure
97
compliance with Apprendi’s constitutional requirements.
Because Harris has not been expressly overruled, this Comment
must proceed under the assumption that § 924(c)’s discharge provision is a sentencing factor to be found by a judge by a preponderance
of the evidence. However, in light of the Court’s recent sentencing
opinions, the validity of Harris’s conclusions remains doubtful. Certainly if punishment under the discharge provision required the same
constitutional protections as any other offense, the arguments for
applying strict liability would diminish.
IV. THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEAL
WRESTLE OVER INTENT
The Federal Courts of Appeal are split regarding whether sentencing judges are required to determine mens rea under § 924(c)’s
98
discharge provision. One side of the split would hold a defendant
strictly liable under the discharge provision regardless of the defen99
dant’s intent. The other side of the split requires the judge to determine that a defendant has formed a requisite intent before impos100
ing the mandatory ten-year sentence.
This Part explores in detail
both sides of the debate by discussing the various methods that the
courts of appeals have used to analyze the issue and the reasoning
behind their conclusions.
A. Strict Liability and the Nava-Sotelo Rule
The Sixth Circuit was the first to address this issue, in United
101
States v. Tunstall, in which the defendant robbed a bank with a
96

See Brief of Appellee at 38–39 n.11, United States v. Brown, 449 F.3d 154 (D.C.
Cir. 2006) (No. 04-3159) (explaining that at trial, the jury determined the issue of
whether defendant discharged the firearm, even though “[p]utting the issue of
whether the firearm was discharged to the jury was not required and contrary to the
ruling of Harris”).
97
See id.
98
Compare United States v. Nava-Sotelo, 354 F.3d 1202, 1206 (10th Cir. 2003), and
United States v. Tunstall, 49 Fed. App’x 581 (6th Cir. 2002), with United States v.
Brown, 449 F.3d 154 (D.C. Cir. 2006), and United States v. Dare, 425 F.3d 634, 640
(9th Cir. 2005).
99
Nava-Sotelo, 354 F.3d at 1206; Tunstall, 49 Fed. App’x at 582.
100
Brown, 449 F.3d at 156; Dare, 425 F.3d at 641 n.3.
101
Tunstall, 49 Fed. App’x at 581.
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shotgun and accidentally discharged the shotgun upon fleeing the
102
bank. Tunstall pled guilty to armed robbery and to using a firearm
while committing a crime of violence under § 924(c)(1), and the
judge enhanced his sentence to ten years because the firearm was
103
The Sixth Circuit approved Tunstall’s sentence withdischarged.
out a great deal of analysis, noting simply that section 924(c) lacked
104
an express intent requirement. However, the court also found that
Tunstall’s ten-year sentence would alternatively have been appropriate under § 924(c)(1)(B)(i), because the weapon he used was a shot105
gun. Thus, the opinion provides little insight regarding the analysis
of the statute’s discharge provision.
106
The Tenth Circuit, in United States v. Nava-Sotelo, conducted a
more thorough analysis and found that a sentencing judge must increase a sentence to ten years for an accidental discharge, regardless
107
of the defendant’s intent. In a plot to free his brother from federal
prison, Nava-Sotelo approached two officers with a loaded firearm in
his hand while they were escorting his brother from a dental clinic
108
One officer struggled with Nava-Sotelo and
back to prison.
grabbed for the gun, causing the firearm to discharge into the
109
Nava-Sotelo
ground while Nava-Sotelo’s finger was on the trigger.
110
had never pointed the firearm at anyone.
Nava-Sotelo was charged under several federal statutes, including discharge of a firearm during a crime of violence under § 924(c),
111
and he pled guilty to all counts.
During the pre-sentencing hearing, the district court addressed Nava-Sotelo’s objections that “he
should receive only a seven-year consecutive sentence . . . rather than
a ten-year sentence, because the discharge of the firearm was acci112
The court agreed and sentenced him to
dental and involuntary.”
113
seven years.
The government “accept[ed] the district court’s factual finding that the discharge of the firearm was accidental, even involuntary. Nonetheless, it insist[ed] the language of § 924(c) plainly
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113

Id. at 582.
Id.
Id.
Id.
354 F.3d 1202 (10th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1206.
Id. at 1203.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1204.
Nava-Sotelo, 354 F.3d at 1204.
Id.

NAPORANO (FINAL)

2008]

12/1/2008 12:45:32 PM

COMMENT

1581

requires the district court to impose a ten-year consecutive sentence;
whether the discharge of the firearm was intentional or accidental is
114
of no moment.”
First, the Tenth Circuit recognized that the plain language of
the statute does not expressly require that the defendant intentionally discharge the weapon to be liable for the ten-year mandatory
115
Instead of using traditional tools of statutory construcminimum.
tion and exploring legislative history and intent, the court focused on
the ruling in Harris that the brandishing and discharge provisions are
116
The court distinguished a sentencing factor
sentencing factors.
from an element of an offense, declaring that “[o]nly the latter re117
quires a mens rea.” To support this proposition, the court cited its
118
prior decision in United States v. Eads. In Eads, the court held that a
person carrying a machine gun during a drug trafficking offense
could be given a minimum sentence of thirty consecutive years in
prison under § 924(c) without finding that the defendant knew that
119
the firearm was a machine gun. The court based its decision on its
finding that Congress intended that the type of weapon be a sentenc120
ing factor rather than an element of the offense.
To bolster its assertion that sentencing factors do not require a
finding of mens rea, the Tenth Circuit cited numerous opinions from
federal courts of appeals that discarded the mens rea requirement for
121
sentencing factors under various federal statutes and guidelines.
The court further explained that Nava-Sotelo had already demon114

Id.
Id. at 1205.
116
Id. at 1205–06.
117
Id. at 1206 n.8.
118
191 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 1999).
119
Id. at 1214. The Eads court ruled under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B) (1994),
which provides:
If the firearm possessed by a person convicted of a violation of this subsection—
(i) is a short-barreled rifle, short-barreled shotgun, or semiautomatic assault weapon, the person shall be sentenced to a term
of imprisonment of not less than 10 years; or
(ii) is a machine-gun or a destructive device, or is equipped with
a firearm silencer or firearm muffler, the person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 30 years.
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B).
120
Eads, 191 F.3d at 1214.
121
United States v. Nava-Sotelo, 354 F.3d 1202, 1206 (10th Cir. 2003) (citing
United States v. King, 345 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Gonzalez, 262
F.3d 867 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Schnell, 982 F.2d 216 (7th Cir. 1992);
United States v. Lavender, 224 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2000)).
115
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strated his “vicious will”; thus he was not being penalized for his “ap122
parently innocent conduct.”
Finally, the court dismissed the defendant’s rule of lenity argument by finding Congress’s purpose in making this provision a sen123
tencing factor was clear and unambiguous, thus falling back on its
original claim that sentencing factors do not require a mens rea.
Since the Supreme Court in Harris concluded that the discharge provision is a sentencing factor, anyone who argues that the provision
requires a finding of mens rea would be “shoveling sand against the
124
tide.”
The Southern District of New York reiterated this proposi125
tion in United States v. Whitley. In Whitley, the defendant held up two
store clerks with a firearm. While stealing money from the cash regis126
ter, he accidentally shot himself in the face. The court, citing NavaSotelo, simply ruled that a jury need not consider the defendant’s in127
tent to discharge a firearm under § 924(c). Moreover, other courts
have relied on this rule to hold defendants strictly liable for sentenc128
ing enhancements in other provisions under § 924(c).
129
In United States v. Dean, the Eleventh Circuit followed the
Tenth Circuit’s ruling in Nava-Sotelo and affirmed that § 924(c)’s dis130
charge provision lacked a mens rea requirement.
Petitioner Dean
was convicted of a bank robbery in which he had accidentally dis131
Recognizing that the
charged his gun while grabbing the money.
provision lacks any express mens rea requirement, the court of appeals focused on the fact that defendants convicted of the offense
triggering sentence enhancement pursuant to § 924(c) have already
demonstrated a vicious will; therefore, “the danger of imposing pun132
ishment upon an innocent party is absent.”
This analysis mirrors
the Tenth Circuit reasoning in Nava-Sotelo, yet the court in Dean did
not go so far as to rule that sentencing factors are inherently strict liability provisions. Moreover, the court noted that discharging a firearm presents a greater risk of harm than mere possession or bran-

122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132

Id. at 1207.
Id.
Id. at 1205.
No. S1-04-Cr.-1381, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29868 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2005).
Id. at *2.
Id. at *7–8.
See, e.g., United States v. Gamboa, 439 F.3d 796, 812 (8th Cir. 2006).
No. 06-14918, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 3507 (11th Cir. Feb. 20, 2008).
Id. at *12.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *12.
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133

dishing, and that the enhancements apply to conduct, not intent.
Finally, the court denied that the presumption against strict liability
134
exists when dealing with sentencing enhancements.
B. Requirement Intent
The Ninth Circuit briefly addressed the issue of a requirement of
135
intent in United States v. Dare.
Dare brought two men to his home
from a bar, one of whom was a police informant, and sold the infor136
Dare then produced his shotgun,
mant a $200 bag of marijuana.
stating “that he ‘didn’t want any badges coming back at me for selling
137
drugs.’”
He offered the gun to his friend to shoot, yet his friend
138
Dare, who had a history of shooting off his gun
declined to do so.
139
140
with visitors, fired the gun out his door into the air.
Dare pleaded guilty for possessing the shotgun in furtherance of
the drug trafficking crime but disputed the penalty under the dis141
charge provision,
claiming that he was intoxicated and that the
142
The district court
provision required a finding of specific intent.
judge reluctantly sentenced Dare to ten years under the discharge
143
provision, upset that he “had no discretion here.”
Meanwhile, the
144
judge sentenced Dare to zero months for possession of marijuana.
The majority of the circuit court’s opinion discussed the applicable Sixth Amendment protections for the discharge provision under Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker and the standard of proof required to
145
The court merely adsentence a defendant under the provision.

133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143

Id. at *13.
Id.
425 F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 636.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 644 (Bea, J., dissenting).
Id. at 636 (Leavy, J.)
United States v. Dare, 425 F.3d 634, 637 (9th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 641 n.3.
Id. at 637. The trial judge felt that the mandatory sentence was unfair:
You have a man who’s lived in a community for 25 years, who is recognized as hard working, honest, reliable, who would give the shirt off of
his back to anybody, who has given two sons to this country to defend
this country, and we’re going to lock him up for ten years and that’s
not outrageous? I think it is. So I will be a part of the outrage. Unwillingly. But I’m going to do it.

Id.
144
145

Id. at 638.
Id. at 638–48.
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dressed Dare’s intent argument in a footnote, noting that the statute
does not define “discharge,” and determined that the discharge pro146
Thus,
vision under § 924(c) requires a finding of general intent.
147
the court posited, Dare’s intoxication defense failed.
The D.C. Circuit conducted a thorough analysis of the discharge
148
provision’s intent requirement in United States v. Brown.
Brown entered a bank with a semiautomatic pistol and forced bank employees
149
at gunpoint to fill a bag with cash. As Brown zipped up the bag, his
150
gun went off. He was startled and asked around if anyone was hurt,
151
The trial court, being overly cautious in light of
but no one was.
Apprendi, sent the issue of the discharge to the jury to determine be152
yond a reasonable doubt.
While deliberating, the jury asked the
judge whether the gun had to be discharged knowingly, and the
153
The jury found that the firearm
judge responded that it did not.
154
had been discharged, and the judge imposed a ten-year sentence.
On appeal, the court of appeals analyzed the structure of §
924(c)(1)(A), noting that that the first two provisions—the underlying offense and brandishing provisions—both required proof of
155
mens rea. In examining the applicability of the underlying offense
156
provision of § 924(c)(1), the court looked to United States v. Harris,
in which the same court had interpreted the pre-1998 version of §
157
In its analysis of
924(c) and determined that intent was required.
the brandishing provision, the court considered the statute’s definition of brandish and found it to contain an explicit intent require158
The statute defines “brandish” as “to display all or part of
ment.
the firearm, or otherwise make the presence of the firearm known to
another person, in order to intimidate that person, regardless of
159
The court
whether the firearm is directly visible to that person.”
146

Id. at 641–42 n.3.
United States v. Dare, 425 F.3d 634, 641–42 n.3 (9th Cir. 2005).
148
449 F.3d 154 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
149
Id. at 155.
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
Brief of Appellee at 38–39 n.11, United States v. Brown, 449 F.3d 154 (D.C. Cir.
2006) (No. 04-3159).
153
Brown, 449 F.3d at 155.
154
Id. at 155–56.
155
Id.
156
959 F.2d 246 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Do not confuse this case with the Supreme
Court’s decision in United States v. Harris, 536 U.S. 545 (2006). See supra Part II.
157
Harris, 959 F.2d at 258–59.
158
Brown, 449 F.3d at 157.
159
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(4) (2006).
147
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reasoned that § 924(c) defines “brandish” because Congress intended
160
the term to have a broader meaning than the dictionary definition.
For instance, under the statute a defendant can “brandish” a hidden
161
or invisible firearm by making its presence known.
Indeed, the
drafters of § 924(c) stated that
[t]he Committee expects that even when a person displays the
outline of a firearm through clothing or other similar shroud the
definition of brandish will be satisfied. For example, this would
encompass such conduct as a person pointing a firearm through a
coat pocket, so that only the outline of the barrel of the firearm is
162
visible.

Thus, the court concluded, the natural progression of the statute is to
penalize increasingly culpable behavior, and since discharging a firearm is a more culpable act, it should require proof of mens rea as
163
well.
Expressing distaste for strict liability penalties, the court marshaled various arguments to support its position. Two doctrines that
shaped the court’s discussion include the general presumption
164
against strict liability in criminal statutes and the rule of lenity. The
court was also concerned that clearly innocent defendants could be
held strictly liable for the discharge of a firearm, regardless of their
165
For instance, under a strict liability reading,
role in the discharge.
a defendant might be penalized if a third party took control of the
firearm and discharged it or if the firearm discharged when the de166
fendant dropped it to comply with a police order.
The court also confronted its prior holding in United States v.
167
Harris, in which it found that a provision in the pre-1998 version of
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)—prescribing a thirty-year minimum sentence to
defendants who use a machine-gun during the commission of a
crime—does not require a finding that the defendant know of the
168
The Harris court refused to imply a
precise nature of the weapon.
mens rea requirement into the machine gun provision because it
could not distinguish culpability between a person who commits a
crime with a pistol and one who uses a machine-gun, claiming that
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168

Brown, 449 F.3d at 157.
Id.
H.R. REP. NO. 105-344, at 12–13 (1997).
Brown, 449 F.3d at 156.
Id. at 157.
Id.
Id.
959 F.2d 246 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
Id. at 258–59.
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“the act is different, but the mental state is equally blameworthy.”
After examining this ruling, the Brown court professed that the conclusion reached in Harris was not only cast in doubt by dicta in a sub170
sequent Supreme Court opinion but was also easily distinguishable
171
from the facts of the present case.
In conclusion, the Brown court criticized the Tenth Circuit’s
holding in Nava-Sotelo as “broad” and stated that “the proposition that
the Constitution imposes no such requirement (assuming its truth)
responds neither to our concern for disrupting § 924(c)’s apparent
structure nor to the presumption against strict liability in criminal
172
statutes and the rule of lenity.”
This conclusion implies that even
though the discharge provision may be a sentencing factor, such a
finding does not automatically relieve the state from the burden of
proving criminal intent. That implication directly conflicts with the
173
proposition stated in Nava-Sotelo.
After determining that the discharge provision required some
finding of intent, the Brown court pondered what level of intent
174
would suffice.
Following the Model Penal Code’s approach to sta175
tutory interpretation, the court settled on a form of general intent
176
that included purpose, knowledge, or recklessness. It believed that
requiring some minimal level of intent was the best way to ensure the
177
The
“exclusion of mere accident” as a punishable state of mind.
court then found that Brown did not act recklessly when he dis178
charged his weapon.
It reasoned that bank robbers who brandish
weapons are acting inherently reckless; therefore, holding a robber
accountable for a discharge because of this fact would nullify and
make meaningless the mens rea requirement under the discharge

169

Id. at 259.
Brown, 449 F.3d at 158 (noting that “the difference between carrying a pistol
and carrying a machinegun [is] ‘great, both in degree and kind’” (quoting Castillo v.
United States, 530 U.S. 120, 126 (2000))).
171
Id. (opining that the characteristics of a weapon would almost always be obvious to the defendant).
172
Id.
173
United States v. Nava-Sotelo, 354 F.3d 1202, 1206 n.8 (10th Cir. 2003).
174
Brown, 449 F.3d at 158–59.
175
Id. at 158 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (1985)) (“When the culpability
sufficient to establish a material element of an offense is not prescribed by law, such
element is established if a person acts purposely, knowingly or recklessly with respect thereto.”).
176
Id. at 158–59.
177
Id. at 158.
178
Id. at 159.
170
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179

provision. Thus, in the D.C. Circuit, a defendant can be sentenced
under § 924(c)’s discharge provision only if “the discharge itself arose
180
out of any act manifesting additional disregard of others’ safety.”
V. THE DUBIOUS RULE THAT SENTENCING
FACTORS NEVER REQUIRE DETERMINATIONS OF INTENT
The Tenth Circuit in Nava-Sotelo found the gun control statute to
be unambiguous; therefore, it conducted a more limited statutory
181
analysis than the D.C. Circuit conducted in Brown.
The Tenth Circuit implied strict liability into § 924(c)’s discharge provision by
combining the Supreme Court’s ruling in Harris that the discharge
provision is a sentencing factor with the blanket generalization that
182
sentencing factors do not require mens rea. In doing so, the court
promulgated a rule that defendants will always be strictly liable for
183
any sentence enhancement that is not a separate offense. This Part
argues that the rule relied on by the Nava-Sotelo court—that mens rea
is not implicated by a sentencing factor—is a distorted interpretation
that has little legal support or justification.
Indisputably, with the creation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and mandatory minimum statutes, federal courts have increas184
ingly treated sentencing enhancements as strict liability penalties.
179

Id.
Brown, 449 F.3d at 159.
181
United States v. Nava-Sotelo, 354 F.3d 1202, 1207 (10th Cir. 2003).
182
Id. at 1205–06.
183
Id. at 1206 (“Because the brandishing and discharge provisions of § 924(c) are
sentencing factors, not elements, the government was not required to show that Nava-Sotelo knowingly or intentionally discharged his weapon. Accountability is strict;
the mere fact that the weapon discharged is controlling.”). Courts have since cited
this rule to dismiss mens rea requirements under other provisions within 18 U.S.C. §
924(c). See United States v. Gamboa, 439 F.3d 796, 812 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding that
defendant need not know that the firearm was a machine-gun to be sentenced under
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii) (2006)).
184
See Singer, supra note 83, at 143 (“Between 1986 and 2000, federal courts (and
to some extent their state counterparts) often avoided the question of whether mens
rea applied to a statutorily enunciated fact by denying that the fact was an element at
all but was, rather, a ‘sentencing factor.’”); Griffiths, supra note 84, at 1028–29.
Courts interpreting the mens rea requirements of both the mandatoryminimum statutes and the Sentencing Guidelines have emphasized
their tendency to bifurcate the trial into discrete phases: a trial phase
and a penalty phase. At the trial phase, prosecutors establish a threshold mens rea to convict the defendant of the substantive crime. At the
penalty phase, therefore, there is no need to prove an additional mens
rea for any of the aggravating factors linked to severity of sentence.
These are not part of the “corpus delicti” of the crime, and therefore
are factors beyond the reach of mens rea.
180
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Courts have sentenced defendants under various enhancements re185
For instance, the cases that the
gardless of mental culpability.
Nava-Sotelo court relied on for its proposition that the discharge provision does not contain a mens rea requirement all found that sentencing enhancements, whether Guideline enhancements or criminal
186
statutes, are strict liability penalties. Ironically, however, two out of
the four cases that the Nava-Sotelo court cited to support its rule that
sentencing factors are strict liability penalties are from the Ninth Cir187
cuit, which would later rule in Dare that § 924(c)’s discharge provision, a sentencing factor as defined by the Supreme Court, did re188
quire intent.
Nava-Sotelo’s holding seems to have confused that
court’s statement that “sentencing factors . . . are not normally required
189
to carry their own mens rea requirements” with its own conclusion
that sentencing factors can never carry their own mens rea require190
ments.
The remaining cases cited as support in Nava-Sotelo may also be
distinguished by their reasoning. The courts in these cases all concluded that the enhancements at issue lacked intent requirements,
but only after analyzing the statute or Federal Sentencing Guideline
191
For instance, the King court reprovision’s structure and history.

Id. (footnotes omitted).
185
Alan C. Michaels, Constitutional Innocence, 112 HARV. L. REV. 828, 891–92
(1999).
Criminal statutes frequently contain a strict liability element that makes
a greater crime out of conduct that is already a crime without the strict
liability element. Although the constitutionality of this use of strict liability is often challenged, it is almost always upheld. Thus, the survey
revealed many decisions upholding statutes punishing felony murder
(imposing strict liability as to causing a death during the intentional
commission of a felony), the sale of illegal drugs in specially protected
areas (imposing strict liability as to the specially protected area), and
involving a minor in a crime, as victim or participant (imposing strict
liability as to the age of the minor), as well as statutes enhancing sentences for otherwise illegal possession of a weapon because of some
special fact about the weapon, such as it being stolen (imposing strict
liability as to the special fact about the weapon).
Id. (footnotes omitted).
186
United States v. King, 345 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Gonzalez,
262 F.3d 867 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Lavender, 224 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2000);
United States v. Schnell, 982 F.2d 216 (7th Cir. 1992).
187
Gonzalez, 262 F.3d 867; Lavender, 224 F.3d 939.
188
United States v. Dare, 425 F.3d 634, 641–42 n.3 (9th Cir. 2005).
189
Lavender, 224 F.3d at 941(emphasis added).
190
United States v. Nava-Sotelo, 354 F.3d 1202, 1206 (10th Cir. 2003).
191
King, 345 F.3d at 152–53; Schnell, 982 F.2d at 220 (“As the Mobley and Taylor
courts have demonstrated, both the structure and the history of the guidelines clear-
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lied on the structure of 21 U.S.C. § 841, which places a mens rea
requirement under subsection (a), the substantive offense, but not
193
The court noted that
under subsection (b), the penalty section.
since “one need not read subsection (a) in order for subsection (b)
to be grammatically coherent,” then subsection (b) is independent
194
But §
and does not retain subsection (a)’s mens rea requirement.
924(c)(1)(A)(iii), the discharge provision, is an incomplete phrase,
and seemingly must be read in conjunction with § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) to
be grammatically coherent.
Since the underlying offense, §
195
924(c)(1)(A)(i), has been found to have an intent requirement,
the discharge provision would then require intent as well under
196
King’s reasoning.
Not all federal courts agree that mens rea’s role disappears
197
For example, several federal appelduring the sentencing phase.
late courts have implied an intent requirement under a Guideline
enhancement that increases the penalty for possession of child por198
Furthermore, the
nography if the material is sadistic or violent.
199
Supreme Court has not ruled on this particular issue but has ex-

ly show that the Sentencing Commission intended to omit the element of mens rea
in § 2K2.1(b)(4).”).
192
21 U.S.C. § 841 (2006).
193
Id.
194
King, 345 F.3d at 153.
195
United States v. Brown, 449 F.3d 154, 156 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Nava-Sotelo, 354
F.3d at 1205.
196
Cf. King, 345 F.3d at 153.
197
See United States v. Cordoba-Hincapie, 825 F. Supp. 485, 521 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
The operation of the mens rea principle takes on a special character at
the sentencing stage. Because most theoretical and doctrinal analysis
of problems of mental states has focused on the conviction stage, one
might assume that concerns about the mens rea principle fall away once
a finding of guilt has attached. In fact, the opposite is true.
Id.; see also United States v. Burke, 888 F.2d 862, 866 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“Although
cases generally apply [the presumption against strict liability] to statutes that define
criminal offenses, we have little doubt that it should also be applied to legal norms
that define aggravating circumstances for purposes of sentencing.”).
198
A defendant convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) (2006) for knowingly receiving child pornography will be subject to a four-level enhancement under U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2(b)(3) if “the offense involved material that
portrays sadistic or masochistic conduct or other depictions of violence.” Some circuit courts require a finding that the defendant intended to receive material that was
sadistic, masochistic, or violent. See United States v. Burnette, No. 99-5585, 2000 U.S.
App. LEXIS 26777 (6th Cir. Oct. 17, 2000); United States v. Tucker, 136 F.3d 763,
764 (11th Cir. 1998); United States v. Kimbrough, 69 F.3d 723, 734 (5th Cir. 1995).
But see United States v. Walton, 255 F.3d 437 (7th Cir. 2001) (intent not required).
199
Kennedy, supra note 56, at 755.
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tended the rule of lenity to statutory provisions that enhance penal200
ties.
The holding in Nava-Sotelo is further weakened by the fact that
the pillar on which it stands, the Harris Court’s ruling that relegates
the discharge provision to sentencing factor status, was tenuously de201
cided by a five-to-four majority and cast into doubt by subsequent
202
Nava-Sotelo relied on Harris to demonSupreme Court decisions.
strate that sentencing enhancements deny defendants the full range
203
of procedural rights.
Should the Court overrule or modify the
holding in Harris, a sentencing enhancement that mandates three
additional years in prison would invoke the full panoply of rights, including an intent requirement.
VI. WHY § 924(C)’S DISCHARGE PROVISION SHOULD NOT
PENALIZE UNINTENTIONAL CONDUCT
A brief description of tools used by judges to determine legislative intent is necessary for an analysis of the discharge provision’s intent requirement. An overriding concept in statutory interpretation
of criminal statutes is the presumption of mens rea. The mens rea
principle was summed up by William Blackstone as follows: “an unwarrantable act without a vicious will is no crime at all. So that to
constitute a crime against human laws, there must be, first, a vicious
will; and, secondly, an unlawful act consequent upon such vicious
204
will.” This principle has long been recognized as a staple for crimi205
nal punishment and continues to permeate modern criminal law as
206
an indispensable theory. Yet the Supreme Court has never created
a hard rule defining mens rea’s constitutional role in statutory inter207
pretation, much less clear guidance establishing the connection be200

Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387 (1980).
See supra notes 86–90 and accompanying text.
202
See supra notes 92–97 and accompanying text.
203
United States v. Nava-Sotelo, 354 F.3d 1202, 1206 (10th Cir. 2003).
204
2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *20–21.
205
See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 n.4 (1952).
206
See id. at 250 (describing mens rea as “no provincial or transient notion. It is as
universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human
will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between
good and evil.”); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951) (“The existence
of mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of AngloAmerican criminal jurisprudence.”).
207
Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619–20 (1994) (“Neither this Court nor,
so far as we are aware, any other has undertaken to delineate a precise line or set
forth comprehensive criteria for distinguishing between crimes that require a mental
element and crimes that do not.” (quoting Morissette, 342 U.S. at 260)); see also Darryl
201
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tween criminal intent and sentencing factors under required manda208
tory minimum statutes. Instead, federal courts have been interpreting statutes by using a variety of tools that include the rule of lenity
209
and the presumption against strict liability.
The rule of lenity was originally developed in seventeenth- to
eighteenth-century England to nullify harsh, unwarranted penal210
ties.
When courts are faced with competing interpretations of a
statutory provision and one would increase the defendant’s penalty
more than the other, the court should choose the more lenient in211
The touchstone of
terpretation if congressional intent is unclear.
212
If analysis of a statute’s language,
lenity is statutory ambiguity.
structure, history, and policies fails to reveal Congress’s intent regarding a specific statutory provision, the defendant’s interpretation of
213
The rule, although its enforcement is
the statute should prevail.
214
criticized as sporadic and unpredictable, has been consistently applied by the Supreme Court to prevent the criminalization of unin215
Additionally, the Court has used lenity to intertentional conduct.
pret statutory crimes as well as statutory provisions that increase
penalties for those crimes, for, according to the Supreme Court, “this
principle of statutory construction applies not only to interpretations
of the substantive ambit of criminal prohibitions, but also to the pen216
alties they impose.”
Thus, mandatory minimum sentencing enhancements are subject to the rule of lenity.
Another doctrine of statutory interpretation, and one which
217
grew out of the Court’s enmity toward strict liability crimes, is that
K. Brown, Watching Legislatures for Apprendi’s Effects on Plea Bargaining, 4 CAL. CRIM. L.
REV. 3, 11 (2002) (describing Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957), as “having
suggested a constitutional requirement of mens rea that has since gone nowhere;
even though the Court disfavors strict liability crimes by interpreting statutes to contain mens rea elements, no due process requirement has evolved from Lambert to seriously limit strict liability”).
208
Kennedy, supra note 56, at 755.
209
See United States v. Nofziger, 878 F.2d 442, 452–53 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Liparota v.
United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426 (1984).
210
Note, The New Rule of Lenity, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2420, 2421, 2424 (2006).
211
Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387 (1980).
212
Id. at 387 (quoting Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65 (1980)).
213
Id.
214
The New Rule of Lenity, supra note 210, at 2423.
215
Id. at 2431–33 (citing Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696
(2005); United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (1995); Staples v. United States, 511
U.S. 600 (1994); Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994); United States v.
Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505 (1992)).
216
Bifulco, 447 U.S. at 387.
217
United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437–38 (1978).

NAPORANO (FINAL)

1592

12/1/2008 12:45:32 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:1567

courts will interpret ambiguous statutes with a presumption against
218
The Court will not dismiss an intent requirement in
strict liability.
statutory provisions because of a “simple omission of the appropriate
219
phrase from the statutory definition.” Instead, congressional intent
to discard a scienter requirement within a statute must be accompanied by some form of evidence of that intent within the statute’s
220
structure or legislative history.
From one perspective (essentially that of the D.C. Circuit), the
issue of whether § 924(c)’s discharge provision requires a finding of
criminal intent seems simply to be one of traditional statutory inter221
Thus, under principles of statutory construction, conpretation.
gressional purpose regarding whether a scienter is a required element must be determined by analyzing the text, structure, and history
222
This Part argues that a traditional statutory analysis
of the statute.
of the text, structure, history, and purpose of § 924(c)’s discharge
provision produces an implied intent requirement, and alternatively,
that the provision’s intent requirement is ambiguous and should be
construed according to the rule of lenity and the presumption
against strict liability.
While the underlying provision that criminalizes possession of a
weapon during the commission of a violent or drug trafficking crime
contains no express intent requirement, the courts have implied an
223
intent requirement.
The brandish and discharge provisions of §
224
924(c) also lack express intent requirements. However, as noted by
225
the court in Brown, the statute contains a separate subsection that
226
defines “brandish.”
The majority of courts that have heard this issue have interpreted the definition of “brandish” as containing a re227
quirement that the convicted intended to brandish the firearm.
218

Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250–63 (1952).
U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 438.
220
Id. (“Certainly far more than the simple omission of the appropriate phrase
from the statutory definition is necessary to justify dispensing with an intent requirement.”).
221
United States v. Brown, 449 F.3d 154, 156 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
222
United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 53 (1994).
223
Brown, 449 F.3d at 156; United States v. Nava-Sotelo, 354 F.3d 1202, 1205 (10th
Cir. 2003).
224
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii–iii) (2000).
225
Brown, 449 F.3d at 156.
226
Id.
227
Id.; United States v. Beaudion, 416 F.3d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 2005) (“To ‘brandish’ a weapon for purposes of § 924(c)(1), then, requires: 1) the open display of the
firearm, or knowledge of the firearm’s presence by another in some manner, and 2)
the purpose of intimidation.” (emphasis added)); United States v. Clark, 41 Fed. Appx.
219
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The statute, however, does not include a definition for the term “discharge.”
That the first two provisions contain an intent requirement while
the third does not may yield dual interpretations: either (1) that
Congress, by omitting an intent requirement for the third provision,
intended to distinguish it from the others as not requiring mens
228
rea; or alternatively, (2) that the intent requirement in the first two
provisions creates a pattern of requiring mens rea, which naturally
229
progresses to the third.
The answer might lie in Congress’s use of
definitions. Congress included the definition of “brandish” to ensure
that the use of a firearm to threaten another, even though it might
230
not be visible, would still trigger § 924(c)’s brandishing provision.
Otherwise, courts would apply the plain and ordinary meaning of
“brandish” and likely exclude non-visible, though threatening, uses of
a firearm. Congress did not define “brandish” in the statute for the
purpose of creating an explicit intent requirement. If it had then
Congress would seem to have purposely omitted an explicit intent
requirement for the discharge provision. Therefore, since Congress
defined “brandish” in the statute specifically to address the use of
concealed firearms—not to include an intent requirement—then the
argument that Congress purposely left the term “discharge” without
an intent requirement is weakened.
Furthermore, why include express requirements of intent for
one term but not the other? According to its plain and ordinary
231
meaning, to brandish an object is an inherently intentional action,
and Congress’s use of intent-based language, such as “in order to in232
timidate,” added no extraordinary meaning to the term. This may
indicate that Congress did not purposely draft an intent requirement
into one term and omit it in another. Rather, Congress drafted the
statute to define “brandish” ordinarily, albeit to also include hiddenbrandishing, and left “discharge” alone. Again, this argues against
745, 749 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Davis, 240 F. Supp. 2d 322, 324–25
(E.D.P.A. 2003); see also United States v. Cain, 440 F.3d 672, 677 n.5 (5th Cir. 2006)
(emphasizing that the “statute itself defines ‘brandish’ to include the display of a
firearm ‘in order to intimidate [a] person.’”). But see Nava-Sotelo, 354 F.3d at 1205–06.
228
Brown, 449 F.3d at 157–58 (explaining the government’s arguments).
229
Id. at 156 (settling on this interpretation).
230
Id. at 157; see also supra notes 158–62 and accompanying text.
231
See Brown, 449 F.3d at 157. Dictionary definitions of “brandish” include “[t]o
wave or flourish threateningly, as a weapon,” and “[t]to shake or wave (a weapon)
menacingly [or] to exhibit or expose in an ostentatious, shameless, or aggressive
manner.” WEBSTER’S II NEW RIVERSIDE DICTIONARY 89 (1984); THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 268 (1981).
232
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(4) (2006).
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viewing the discharge provision’s lack of expressly stated intent as a
third outlier. If both interpretations seem equally plausible, however,
ambiguity invites the use of lenity and the presumption against strict
liability.
An examination of the statute’s congressional record reveals that
the comments made by legislators regarding the increased sentence
under the discharge provision overwhelmingly used the verb “dis233
charge” in its active form with the defendant as the subject. For instance, Representative McCollum, then Chairman of the Subcommitee on Crime, made the following statements:
And unless we make it the law of the land that criminal gun use
will put you in prison for a long, long time, we and all of our
loved ones will continue to remain in grave danger any time some
young thug decides to pull the trigger. . . . By golly, if they pull the trigger under this bill, they should get an additional 20-year mandatory sentence. . . . We have brandishing, which is pointing the
234
gun, which gets 15, and pulling the trigger, which gets 20.

Similar statements were made by Representative Buyer: “if a thug dis235
charges the firearm, then the mandatory minimum is 20 years”; and
Representative Cunningham: “[i]f he discharges that weapon, count on
236
20 years in jail.”
The House Subcommittee report indicated that
the statute imposes an additional sentence “[i]f the person discharges
237
the firearm.”
The predominant use of “discharge” in its active form strengthens the argument that Congress intended for § 924(c)’s sentence enhancement to apply only to a defendant who personally committed
the act of discharging the weapon. For instance, the numerous
comments made that “pulling the trigger” results in an increased sen238
tence seems to foreclose the concern that a defendant should be
sentenced under the discharge provision if a third party grabbed the
gun and shot it or if the defendant dropped the gun to comply with a

233

See 144 CONG. REC. H530 passim (1998). But see 144 CONG. REC. H530, H531
(statement of Rep. McCollum) (stating that “discharging will lead to a mandatory 20
years”); id. (stating that “the enhancement provisions for the crime, requires that . . .
the discharging of the gun be committed”); id. at H535 (statement of Rep. Crane)
(“If a gun is discharged during the crime, he will receive a 20 year prison term.”).
234
144 CONG. REC. H530, H531, H534 (1989) (statement of Rep. McCollum)
(emphasis added). Note that the original House bill would have increased the mandatory minimum sentence to twenty years under § 924(c)’s discharge provision.
235
Id. at H533 (statement of Rep. Buyer).
236
Id. at H535 (statement of Rep. Cunningham).
237
H.R. REP. NO. 105-344, at 3 (1997).
238
Id. at 2–16.
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police order and the gun accidentally discharged. Yet, just because
the legislators intended for the discharge provision to apply only to
the defendant who personally commits the act does not necessarily
mean they required that the defendant be mentally culpable for the
act. Still, comments such as those made by Representative McCollum
that the statute protects the public from thugs who “decide to pull
240
the trigger” supports the position that the discharge enhancement
applies only to defendants who, in exercising their free will, decided
and intended to discharge the firearm.
Until the 1998 amendments, a defendant who discharged a firearm during the commission of a crime would have been sentenced
under § 924(c)’s underlying offense for “using or carrying” a firearm
241
Even though the statute contained no express induring a crime.
tent requirement, jury charges under § 924(c)’s “uses or carries” provision required the jury to find that the defendant knowingly or in242
When Congress amended
tentionally “used or carried” a firearm.
the statute, “[i]t replace[d] the ‘uses or carries’ test with increased
penalties for any person who ‘possesses,’ ‘brandishes,’ or ‘discharges’
243
a firearm.” Again, Congress omitted an express intent requirement
for discharging the firearm and made no mention of the required intent during Congressional deliberations or in Committee Reports.
VII. CONCLUSION
The federal courts should disregard the Tenth Circuit’s rule that
sentencing factors do not require a finding of mens rea. Courts
should require proof that that a defendant intended to discharge a
firearm under § 924(c). The Tenth Circuit rule that sentencing factors do not require a finding of mens rea has little legal support and
rests on a shaky Supreme Court decision. Other circuit courts, including those relied on by the court in Nava-Sotelo, have required a
finding of criminal intent during the sentencing phase. Moreover,
considering the Supreme Court’s recent push toward enhancing the
procedural protections afforded to a defendant during sentencing,
such a rule would likely fail under the Court’s scrutiny. A traditional
analysis of congressional intent underlying § 924(c)’s discharge provision reveals little regarding the statute’s culpability requirements;

239
240
241
242
243

United States v. Brown, 449 F.3d 154, 157 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
144 CONG. REC. H531 (statement of Rep. McCollum).
Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 148 (1995).
See United States v. Malpeso, 115 F.3d 155, 165 (2d Cir. 1997).
H.R. REP. NO. 105-344 (1997).
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therefore, a court should be more willing to utilize the rule of lenity
and the presumption against strict liability.
Finally, the opposition to mandatory minimum statutes as a
whole may argue for requiring an intent determination. According
to at least one commentator, the decreased procedural protections
that a defendant receives during sentencing increases the importance
244
of ensuring that the defendant is culpable.
By ruling that the discharge provision is a sentencing factor, the Supreme Court in Harris
has already minimized the procedural rights afforded to the accused.
Thus, by mandating an increased sentence of three years for accidentally discharging a firearm, the statute may impose excessive punishment, which could otherwise be mitigated if judges were allowed dis245
Since judges are not allowed discretion to individualize
cretion.
sentences under mandatory minimum statutes, a movement toward
imputing mens rea during the sentencing stage when these statutes
are ambiguous may be a reasonable method to prevent unjust results.

244

Jack B. Weinstein & Fred A. Bernstein, The Denigration of Mens Rea in Drug Sentencing, 7 FED. SENT’G. REP. 121, 123 (1994).
245
See United States v. Hungerford, No. 05-30500, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 25529, at
*1118–23 (9th Cir. Oct. 13, 2006) (Reinhardt, J., concurring).

